The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as "war" if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived "only" as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a " war"
INTRODUCTION
The issue of cyberspace currently attracts a lot of attention even in the context of international conflicts. News regularly report about cyber warfare and information warfare, where lines are blurred between a traditional war, in which only state actors are participants, and new forms of enmities and warfare which include non-state actors and civilians. Experts speak of nonlinear wars, or of a postmodern blurring of differences between war and peace, good and evil, and often predict terrible futures full of wars against each other, 1 unless a new standard for assessment of such conflicts will be introduced -in order to overcome uncertainties in international relations. Lawyers are already talking about options to include civilians and civilian facilities in military operations, about "cyber conscriptions" -i.e. mobilization of civilian resources for the purpose of war, 2 but also about new possibilities to respond to the new forms of war. 3 While mostly speaking of cyberwarfare, information warfare as another manifestation of nonlinear war (dissemination of conspiracies with the aim of demoralization of population) is often neglected. The aim of our paper is to differentiate between the phenomena of cyber warfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare.
CYBER-AND INFORMATION WARFARE
In what follows, we are primarily interested in a different kind of conflict than an "armed conflict" in proper sense. We shall focus on "wars" that may take various other forms, closer or more distant to the classical concept of war, while mostly they take a "cyber", or "information/electronic" form. Not all illegal activities in cyberspace necessarily have to do with war -e.g. the CRN at the University of Zurich distinguished between various levels of illegal conduct in cyberspace:
activism, hactivism, cybercrime, cyberterrorism and cyberwar. 4 Thereby, even the most intensive illegal conduct is sometimes denied the nature of a "war" proper 1 warfare nor cyberwarfare usually satisfies these conditions -especially that of being "armed". While there are many theoretical attempts to prove that cyber warfare should be considered an armed conflict 12 within the context of the use of force under Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter (valid as a customary rule of ius cogens, thus applicable also to States that might not be UN Members), 13 these attempts have not so far been accepted generally. 14 For example, Schmit proposed to take into account several criteria in order to assess whether a cyber attack meets the characteristics of use of force, and therefore of a "cyberwar": severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability and presumptive illegitimacy. 15 However, Schmit´s criteria were refused as allowing for subjective interpretation. 16 An "information war" must then be perceived as even more ambiguous; it can in fact never be fundamentally considered an "armed conflict", and within international law of war we can see at most an attack on civilian targets (protected in the time of war under the 4th 
POSTMODERN AND NON-LINEAR WARS
It is mostly in relation to the "war on terror" and to "cyberwars" where traditional characteristics of war under the legal definition of war are absent. Žižekian diagnosis) to be features of postmodern and non-linear warfare, the notions of which will be employed throughout this article.
In order to better grasp these postmodern phenomena, in the following we offer an analysis and some examples of cyber warfare, from which certain principles can also be derived for information warfare, both showing specificities which make them distant from traditional warfare, and a part of postmodern conflicts as defined above.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN

CYBERSPACE
On the most general level, the task of ensuring international security is entrusted to the United Nations (UN) organization. In this respect, it incorporated the Charter of the United Nations, signed already on 26th June 1945. 30 The UN Charter features in a prominent place the objectives of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. 31 The security system of the UN is thereby further institutionalized in the form of one of its main bodies -the Security 5 (2015) . 31 UN Charter, Art. 1(1): "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." 32 UN Charter, Art. 24(1): "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." It may also be noted in addition that in the previously exploited four dimensions of space the seizure of each area had required a sufficient military and Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which was tasked to look at the application of international law to cyber conflicts, 42 found this topic to be the most difficult.
Disagreements prevailed between Russia, China and several other countries on one hand, and the Member States of NATO on the other.
The crux of the disagreement was in the applicability of specific provisions of the UN Charter (the general applicability of the Charter had been agreed upon within the GGE), in particular the applicability of Article 2(4), renouncing the use of force, and Article 51 on the inherent right to self-defence. Another issue was whether it is possible to overcome the norms enshrined in the UN Charter and in the international conventions governing the conduct of war and armed conflicts, in order to establish new and specific standards for this type of conflicts. One (the simplest) possibility would be here to re-interpret the UN Charter commitment to avoid actions that threaten territorial integrity or political independence of a state (found in Articles 2(4) and 51) so as to explicitly include cyber actions. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017
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-norms on the proliferation of cyber technologies that could be abused for malevolent purposes (which is still nascent and suffers from definitional problems, though). 
RUSSIA -GEORGIA CONFLICT (2008)
Cyber operations against Georgia took place in late July and early August 2008, before and during an armed conflict with Russia. They caused that governmental websites were offline and Internet services were slowed down.
Especially immediately before and after the Russian troops entered the Georgian province of South Ossetia, several governmental websites were disabled or their content had been replaced by anti-Georgian propaganda, while the DDoS attacks prevented Georgian authorities from dissemination of any information to the citizens. Georgia accused the Russian Federation of these cyber attacks, but Russia denied this and claimed that the attacks were a work of private individuals who did so voluntarily. These cyber operations were then addressed in a report of an independent fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia in 2009, 47 which did not, however, recognize their imputability to Russia, and only stated that "if these attacks were controlled by governments or government, it is likely that this form of warfare was used for the first time in an inter-State armed conflict". 48 Some sources state that the origins of the attacks were in five anonymous systems, out of which four were in Russia and one in Turkey, and at the same time all were controlled by the RNB crime syndicate (a non-state actor, making this hence a nonlinear, postmodern conflict). 
IRAN (2010)
Iran was also a target for cyber attacks in recent years, namely in 2010, in connection with its nuclear program. This was the case of a computer worm called 50 This is a proof of further qualitative step in the use of cyber attacks -despite the fact that the extent of damage is unclear, this incident confirms the potential dangers of malware that can engulf important computer systems managing energy supplies or traffic networks. This case is thus considered the first proof of cyber attacks potentially causing real physical damage and endangering human lives. 51 On this basis one can indeed conclude that Stuxnet was the first global cyber weapon of geopolitical importance. 52 Still, however, no specific state actor was accused or attributed responsibility in this postmodern warfare case.
2014 AND 2015
From the more recent years, one may further invoke events such as an attack on the movie studios of Sony Pictures Entertainment, from which many important documents about movies, celebrities and access data were stolen. The attack was attributed to North Korea in connection with the fact that the studio had just 
THE UKRAINE CRISIS (2013-2016)
The beginning of the so-called Ukraine crisis, or so-called Russia-Ukraine conflict, dates back to 2013 andpersists to this day. Overall, this conflict is often referred to as a hybrid war (hybrid warfare) -a mixture of unconventional tactics and strategies, secret actions, irregular forces, cyber operations and political manipulations in order to achieve political objectives. This basically seems to be a set of tactics to avoid military retaliation and not to exceed the limit, which could be considered a use of force, making it a postmodern conflict par excellence.
Conventional warfare is thus only a part of a larger range of coercive actions available to states in the postmodern situation. In 2011, NATO adopted the "NATO Policy on Cyber Defence". It defines the role and activities of NATO in the field of cyber defence to be developed in the future. In addition to this Policy, a "NATO Cyber Defence Action Plan" was adopted, giving details on tasks and resources on order to achieve the objectives of cyber defence. The Policy and Plan were updated in May 2014 via the "Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence" and at the summit in Wales where the updated "NATO Cyber Defence Action Plan" was approved. This sets out specific tasks in order to fulfil the above Policy, and one of its key tasks is to enhance mutual cooperation between the public sector, private sector and academia. https://lt.justice.gov.sk/Attachment/Vlastn%C3%BD%20materi%C3%A1l_docx.pdf?instEID=-1&attEID=75645& docEID=413095&matEID=7996&langEID=1&tStamp=20150218154455240. 60 The Economist, supra note 45. 61 Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty reads: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017 79 nuclear threats and was only marginally associated with new security challenges.
Leaders of NATO Member States seem thus have newly agreed that a cyber attack on one of the NATO members could be considered an attack on the entire Alliance, and could therefore give rise to a military response. 62
EUROPEAN UNION
The need to ensure cyber security arises also within the EU. From among the more recent actions in this area one can name, inter alia, the document entitled "Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure
Cyberspace", 63 which represents the vision of the EU in relation to preventing cyber disruptions and attacks, as well as with respect to potential countermeasures. The aim is foremost to increase the resilience of information systems against cyber attacks and to strengthen the EU policy on international cyber security and cyber defence. This document thereby defines cyber security as follows:
Cyber-security commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cyber-security strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein.
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In response to this, European Council endorsed an "EU Cyber Defence Policy 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
One of the most recent US documents related to cyber threats is a paper Since the term "cyberwar" itself is mostly used only as a metaphor (especially in case of attacks performed outside actual use of armed force), the concept of "information war" cannot be understood otherwise, by analogy. In terms of lex lata, therefore, information warfare is not to be perceived as a war in legal sense (if not accompanied by kinetic attacks).
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The mutual relationship between cyberwarfare and information warfare could (in line with arguments proposed by Rid) be understood as being two partially overlapping areas, since "information war" can also be pursued by other than apply by analogy to information warfare as well as to cyber warfare. Similarly as with respect to categorization of cyber attacks, it might therefore be possible to propose a specific scale or categorization of degrees of "information attacks" -from the positive promotion, through negative promotion, false propaganda, up to the information warfare (connected to kinetic attacks).
At any rate, it can be concluded that information warfare (using electronic media/cyberspace), just like cyberwarfare, is one of the relatively new kinds of international conflicts that use modern technology, while they are blurring the differences between war and peace, which is considered an expression of the 
CONCLUSIONS
The fact that cybersecurity is one of the key postmodern challenges was sufficiently shown in the cases referred to in this paper: be it the Russia-Georgia 
